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BUSINESS TRUSTS AND BLUE SKY LAWS
By LELAND S. DUXBURY*
C ONSIDERABLE discussion is being aroused by the increasing
resort to the declaration of trust as the means of creating
another vehicle for the carrying on of business. These vehicles,
which for the purpose of this article are loosely referred to as
organizations, have been variously called common law corpora-
tions, common law companies, voluntary associations by declara-
tion of trust, Massachusetts trusts, trusts embarked in trade,
trust estates as business companies, and business trusts. Authori-
ties generally credit their origin to the Massachusetts real estate
trust devised to meet a statute of that state prohibiting corpora-
tions from holding title to real estate. Designed originally to
meet an obvious difficulty the last few years have seen the trust
instrument appealed to throughout the country and trusts pur-
ported to be declared for the carrying on of every conceivable
kind of business or undertaking.' This development has been
so extensive that the modern business trust has by some been
heralded as the successor of the corporation. 2
The greatest growth has been in the launching of new enter-
prises, established business preferring as yet to retain the cor-
porate organization. And while in many instances its use has
been in good faith, in recent years the business trust as an organ-
ization for the carrying on of business has become more and
*Chief Examiner for the Minnesota State Securities Commission.
'Sears, Trust Estates as Business Companies; Dunn, Trusts for Busi-
ness Purposes; Conyngton, Corporate Organization & Finance; Thomp-
son, Business Trusts as Substitutes for Business Corporations; Corporations
and Express Trusts as Business Organizations by H. L. Wilgus, 13 Mich.
L. Rev. 70, 205; The Government and the Corporation, by F. L. Stetson, 110
Atlantic Monthly 27; The Mysterious Massachusetts Trust, by William
W. Cook, 9 Am. Bar Ass'n Jour. 763.2The Passing of the Corporation in Business, by R. J. Powell, 2 MiN-
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more attractive to promoters and organizers of new enterprises
who are constantly on the lookout for a new sugar-coated pill
to assist in foisting their securities on the unwary public.3 This
organization has, therefore, become a vital problem for the vari-
ous bodies administering blue sky laws designed primarily to
regulate the offer and sale of speculative securities. It is the
purpose of this article to discuss the application of such laws
to business trusts and the problems which are raised.
Do BLUE SKY LAWS COVER BUSINESS TRUSTS?
The first question is whether such organizations are subject
to blue sky regulation. When the modern business trust was
new there were no such regulatory laws and no thought was
given to this question. Since such laws have come into existence
various theories have been devised to take them out of the scope
of the statutes, many of these being propounded by the promoter
who is essentially a salesman and not necessarily learned in the
law. The claim that exemption from blue sky laws was to be
enjoyed has, it is believed, been one of the causes of so many
such organizations being created, especially in cases where the
proposition aside from the form of organization lacked sufficient
merit to obtain the necessary license. It has been stated that
they are new creations based upon forgotten constitutional rights
and individual liberties; that they are organizations under the
federal courts; that they are organized under the federal common
law; that their legality and right to exist was due to the fact that
"the constitution holds certain rights as self-evident basic rights,
and provides that neither Congress nor state legislatures shall
have power to interfere with them ;-14 and that they are for all
times free from legislative enactments, including blue sky laws.
Freedom from all the statutory enactments applicable to corpora-
tions has been a substantial selling point in the hands of the pro-
moters and others engaged in the business of organizing business
trusts. In some cases it has been contended that although a busi-
ness trust is an organization which is subject to regulation by
blue sky laws, the particular law in question did not by its lan-
guage cover the specific case. Several cases have been decided
on these points.
3Most of the organizations involved in the recent cleanup of oil stock
promoters in the south resulting in the conviction of the many times famous
Dr. Cook, purported to be trusts. Of the main organization Dr. Cook was
sole trustee.
4From a typical circular issued by a printer who sells blanks for the
formation of business trusts.
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The leading case is People v. Clum,5 in which it was held
that the certificates of preferred stock of the Business Men's
Protective Association, an association organized "under the com-
mon law having a declaration of trust in favor of the association"
was stock within the meaning of the Michigan securities law, and
that the sale thereof was prohibited except in compliance with
the statute.
An Iowa case6 holds that the "member's certificate of inter-
est" in the Texlouana Producing and Refining Company, a com-
mon law company formed by agreement and declaration of trust,
is stock within the meaning of the Iowa securities law,. against
the contention that the certificates were merely "certificates of a
beneficiary share in certain trust property" and that the word
"stock" can apply only to corporate stock. The court said that:
"Its capital is a share capital evidenced by certificates which
may pass from hand to hand," that the certificates give the hold-
ers "no legal right to the property of the trust" and that the word
stock "in common parlance is often used in a broader and more
general sense of shares in voluntary associations and other en-
terprises in which many contribute shares for the promotion of
some common purpQse."
In Idaho,7 it was held that the Montana Syndicate, a common
law trust organized under the laws of Montana, was an "asso-
ciation" within the meaning of the Idaho securities law.
In an Illinois case," the shares of capital of the American
Manufacturing Company, an unincorporated association holding
itself out as organized under the common law in force in Illinois,
were held to be securities within the Illinois securities law. The
statute referred to securities issued by corporations, associations,
trusts, etc., organized under the "laws of the state." It was
contended that the law applied only to securities issued by cor-
porations, associations, trusts, etc., organized under the statute
law of Illinois and not to those organized under the common
law. The court held that the language applied to all those organ-
ized under the laws of Illinois whether statutory or common.
It was also contended that the American Manufacturing Com-
pany was not organized under any of the laws of Illinois, either
statutory or common, but was based upon a written instrument
or contract between the parties, which contract created a trust
5 (1921) 213 Mich. 651, 182 N.W. 136. This case also holds that a sale by
a trustee of a business trust is not a sale by one in a trust capacity created
by law and entitled to exemption as such.6Wagner v. Kelso, (1923) 195 Ia. 959, 193 N.W. 1.
7State v. Cosgrove, (1922) 36 Idaho 278, 210 Pac. 393.
SKinross v. Cooper, (1922) 224 Ill. App. 111.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and authorized the issuance of securities in question, and that to
hold it to be within the regulations of the Illinois securities law
would impair the obligations of a contract and violate the fed-
eral constitution. This contention was not recognized, the court
holding that the police power of the state as represented by the
Illinois statute in question was paramount.
In Missouri,9 the court allowed rescission of a contract for
the purchase of shares in the Missouri Oil & Gas Company, a
common law company operating under a declaration of trust,
one of the reasons being that the contract of purchase was in vio-
lation of the Missouri securities law, no license ever having been
issued for the sale of the shares in question.
In Home Lionber Company v. Hopkins,0 the Home Lumber
Company, which purported to be a common law company formed
by declaration of trust, itself brought mandamus to compel the
State Charter Board to entertain its application for license to
sell securities in Kansas, the board having theretofore refused
the application for reasons hereinafter considered. The supreme
court held on the facts at hand that the Home Lumber Company
was a pure trust, that the board's position was not tenable and
that mandamus should issue, a ruling which was necessarily
based upon a finding that the organization was within the juris-
diction of the Kansas securities law and that the board must,
therefore, accept and consider its application.
A peculiar result was reached in Oregon in the case of Supe-
rior Oil & Refining Syndicate, Ltd. v. Handley.1" The plaintiff
was organized by declaration of trust under the laws of the
state of Texas to manufacture brick and refine crude petroleum,
the declaration providing for the sale and issuance of certifi-
cates of beneficial interests, the proceeds from such sale to be
held in trust and managed for the benefit of the certificate hold-
ers. The Oregon securities law expressly exempted "state and
national bank and trust company stock," the Oregon general
statutes providing that trust business shall include any private
trust and that no foreign partnership, firm, joint stock company,
or association should act in a trust capacity in Oregon without
complying with the provisions of the Oregon statutes with refer-
ence to trust companies. On application for mandamus to com-
pel the issuance of a license for the sale of stock the writ was
denied, the court holding that the applicant organization was
9Schmidt v. Stortz, (Mo. 1922) 236 S.W. 694.
10(1920) 107 Kans. 153, 161, 190 Pac. 601.
1(1921) 99 Ore. 146, 195 Pac. 159.
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within the statutory definition of a trust company and therefore
expressly exempt under the securities law. The court did not
intimate that such organizations were not amenable to the se-
curities law but sustained the position of the enforcing officer
only because of an express exemption.
In Ex Parte Girard,2 a writ of habeas corpus for the release
of a trustee who had sold securities of his trust estate without
license under the securities law of California was refused. The
California law expressly provided that the word "trusts" as used
in the law shall include all voluntary trusts, but the decision
is in point to show that such organizations are subject to regu-
lation by a blue sky act.
In Kentucky, 3 the court held that the Shareholders' Syndicate,
purporting to be a common law trust, and its units of interest,
were within the securities law.
The case of State ex rel. Great American Home Savings
Institution v. Lee, Supervisor of Building and Loan Associa-
tions, is frequently cited as holding that business trusts are
valid and not amenable to blue sky laws. In this case the Great
American Home and Savings Institution formed as "an unin-
corporated association of individuals" brought mandamus to com-
pel the issuance of a certificate authorizing it to do a building
and loan business on a plan set out in its declaration of trust,
which trust agreement constituted the plaintiff, in the opinion
of the court, "what is familiarly known as a common law trust."
The Missouri statutes expressly provided that unincorporated
associations could do a building and loan business. It was con-
tended that the company was within the blue sky law and that
it had not complied therewith. The court held with reference
to the provisions for compliance with the building and loan
statutes that "this requirement is exclusive" and that the com-
pany "is not required to obtain permission to do business from
the state bank commissioner under" the blue sky law. The result
in nowise holds that the organization is a pure trust or that it
could not be made subject to blue sky regulation. Neither does
it show that business trusts have any inherent right to do busi-
ness in any place, as the statute in question expressly authorized
the doing of this business by unincorporated associations.
The result in these cases has usually been reached without
determining whether the organization in question was a pure
12(1921) 186 Cal. 718, 200 Pac. 593.
"3King v. Commonwealth, (1922) 197 Ky. 128, 246 S.W. 162.
14(1921) 288 Mo. 679, 233 S.W. 20.
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trust or not, the court considering it sufficient to say that it was
an "association," or that it clearly was within the broad language
which includes person, company, co-partnership and association,
and in others that its certificates were securities within the
meaning of the statutes in question. The cases, therefore, cannot
all be cited as directly holding that the organizations considered
were pure trusts, or that pure trusts are amenable to blue sky
laws. However, had the courts been of the opinion that the
question of amenability turned on whether or not the organiza-
tion was a pure trust, the decisions doubtless would have cov-
ered this point. The reasoning of the cases is sufficient to include
all organizations commonly referred to as business trusts and to
indicate that the courts regard an express trust as amenable to
the reasonable exercise of the police power represented by blue
sky laws. These laws have been held constitutional, 5 and their
application to business trusts does not unreasonably interfere
with any constitutional rights. Whether such organizations are
based upon the common law, the inalienable right to contract, or
what not, they have no particular charm which removes them
from the scope of the broad general field of regulation embodied
in such laws. As stated by the court in King v. Commonwealth :1-6
"The contention that the act so construed abridges the right
to own property and freely contract with reference thereto in
contravention to rights declared to be inalienable and guaran-
teed to all persons by the state and federal constitutions, is in our
judgment wholly lacking in merit."
The statutes construed in most of the above cases have the
usual broad language of blue sky laws, which language was con-
sidered sufficient to cover the organization in question, the Cali-
fornia case being the only one where the language expressly
refers to trusts. The scope of the laws of other states, including
Minnesota, has not been determined, but it is reasonable to be-
lieve that these cases will be followed and that any statute, such
as the one in Minnesota,' 7 which requires license for "every per-
son, firm, co-partnership, corporation, company, or association"
offering or selling "any stocks, bonds, investment contracts, or
Qther securities issued by him, them, or it" will be held to cover
all the organizations commonly referred to as business trusts.
As stated most of the decisions regard these organizations
for the purposes of blue sky laws as associations. The definitions
15See, A Review of the Cases on Blue Sky Legislation, by Montreville
J. Brown, 7 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 431, note 2.
16(1922) 197 Ky. 128, 246 S.W. 162.
'17Minn., Laws 1917 chap. 429, as amended.
BUSINESS TRUSTS AND BLUE SKY LAWS
of the word "association" usually convey some idea of agree-
ment, co-operation, joining together, or mutuality among the
members. If these organizations are what they purport to be,
pure trusts, it is difficult to see how any of the earmarks of an
association are present. The beneficiaries are not associated to-
gether in any manner, there is clearly no association among the
trustees and the beneficiaries, and the trustees are only loosely
associated as co-trustee. 18 The presence of any elements con-
stituting an association of any of the interested parties probably
precludes a pure trust. A business trust, if a valid pure trust,
presents nothing more than natural persons exercising as trus-
tees the powers conferred by the declaration, among which is
the power to offer and sell certificates representing the beneficial
interests in the estate. There is no super-added entity or associa-
tion as principal over and above the trustees. The trustees as
individuals, working under a trade name,19 are the principals and
when certificates representing beneficial interests are sold by
them, they are, so far as blue sky laws are concerned, "persons"
offering and selling "stock . . . issued by them." That a trust
estate is after all the individuality of the trustees is strongly ad-
vocated by sponsors of business trusts as giving them the right to
do business in any state subject only to such regulations as are
imposed on the citizens of that state, as freeing the organization
from certain kinds of taxation, and as the basis for many of the
supposed advantages. If this view of a pure trust is correct,
it is clear that the general wording of the usual blue sky law is
sufficiently broad. It disposes of the contention advanced in
Kinross v. Cooper,20 that a business trust -was an association or-
ganized by contract and not by virtue of any law, statutory or
common, and was therefore not within the provisions of statute
covering associations organized under the laws of the state, which
position is adopted by a recent text book.2 ' This view is sup-
ported by the following excerpt from the minority opinion in
State v. Cosgrove,2 2 as follows:
"The unit stockholders of a pure trust have no mutual rights
and obligations. . . . The corporation is an artificial being, a
'
8 See Crocker v. Malley, (1919) 249 U.S. 223, 63 L. Ed. 573, 39
S.C.R. 270.
19Business trusts probably must comply with the trade-name statutes.
Filing declaration not sufficient. See Sears, op. cit., p. 375 and 405; Wilgus,
13 Mich. L. Rev. 209; Minn., G. S. 1913, chap. 56B.20(1922) 224 I1. App. 111.21Dunn, Trusts for Business Purposes, chap. 2.
22(1922) 36 Idaho 278, 210 Pac. 393.
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trust is no being at all. A trust is an estate, the equitable title to
which is held by individuals, who bear no contractual relation
between themselves. The Montana Syndicate is but a name rep-
resenting no being, real or artificial, and possessing no powers
or privileges whatsoever, corporate or otherwise."
Had the majority been of the same opinion the organization
being considered would have been held to be outside the Idaho
securities law which includes "every corporation, every co-part-
nership, and every association" and does not use the word "per-
sons."
These cases also seem to dispose of the contentions that
certificates of beneficial interest represent an undivided portion
of the corpus of the trust,. and are not securities, or that the
words of the statutes refer only to corporate stock. The courts
have construed the words "stocks," "bonds," and "securities"
very broadly to cover anything which is representative of a share
in an organization having a share capital,2 3 without determining
just what the security was.2 4
Assuming, as the cases indicate, that the various organiza-
tions referred to as business trusts are within the laws in ques-
tion, regardless of whether they are pure trusts or not, and that
their certificates of beneficial interests are securities the sale of
which is regulated by such laws, how should they be considered
on formal application for .license to sell such securities? Appli-
cations for license to sell stock usually require some showing as to
the nature of the issuing organization.2 5 When the applicant is
a corporation it is essential to determine whether the corporation
is regularly and legally organized and is in fact -what it purports
to be and will represent itself to be, and whether what it desires
23See Wagner v. Kelso, (1923) 195 Ia. 959, 193 N.W. 1; also Malley
v. Bowditch, (1919) 259 Fed. 809, 7 A.L.R. 608.24Because of the adverse decisions rendered some business trusts issue
a certificate which recites that it is evidence of the holder's interest in an
undivided portion of the real estate and other property belonging to the
trust, an apparent attempt to avoid the elements of a share capital. It seems
obvious that such attempts remove the first essential of a pure trust,
namely a corpus the legal title to which is exclusively in the trustees. How-
ever, assuming that such could be done and that such a certificate is evidence
of ownership of certain property, an additional provision to the effect that
the profits of the business shall be divided among the certificate holders
constitutes the certificate, -t least so far as Minnesota is concerned, an
"investment contract" and therefore a security within the Minnesota law.
Participation in profits must be present to make the certificate salable. For
cases discussing the words "investment contracts" in Minnesota, see State
v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., (1920) 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937; State
v. Evans, (1922) 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425; State v. Ogden, (1923)
154 Minn. 425, 191 N.W. 916.
25See Manual of Securities Laws, by Leonard L. Cowan.
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to sell, namely stock in a corporation, is in fact such. Applica-
tions from the organizations under discussion will represent that
the applicant is a common law company organized by declaration
of trust, or some other similar expression, which description to-
gether with the declaration will disclose that applicant purports
to be a trust estate and to enjoy its rights and privileges as a
pure trust by virtue of the law of trusts. The use of the word
"trust" as descriptive of the organization, or saying that it is
formed by "declaration of trust" precludes any other conclusion.
On such applications the questions are similar to those raised
by applications from corporations. Is the applicant in fact a
trust? Is it what it represents itself to be? Are its securities,
whether called certificates of beneficial interest, stock, shares, or
units, what they purport to be, namely, evidence of ownership
of a beneficial interest in a pure trust?
Mere statements that the organization is a trust is not suffi-
cient but consideration must be given to the entire declaration in
the light of the law applicable. On analysis all of the organiza-
tions purporting to be business trusts present nothing more than
the old recognized trust instrument which has been added to and
changed in an attempt to create a vehicle adapted to the desired
purpose. They must still be trusts in fact or they fail to be what
they purport to be, a test to be made by the well established law
of trusts. They can enjoy the advantages claimed, such as no
liability on beneficiaries, perpetual succession, etc., only if they
are in fact pure trusts. Recognition of this rather than approach-
ing them as new creations clarifies the problem.
Considered in this manner many of these organizations -will
fail as pure trusts. As noted, the modern growth of the use of
the declaration of trust has seen an amplifying and changing of
the instrument to meet the particular purpose for which the
organization is to be used. In addition an intention has been
shown to avoid the many burdens attaching to the corporate
organization but on the other hand to retain all the advantages,
this being especially true in those in which an appeal must be
made to the public for finances through the sale of beneficial in-
terests. The promoter has sold his creation to the public by re-
citing all the sins of the corporation and representing that his
organization was free from these but at the same time had all
the corporate advantages. For example, giving the beneficiaries
power to elect trustees, 26 to amend the trust instrument, 27 to. re-
26Whitman v. Porter, (1871) 107 Mass. 522; Dana v. Treasurer, (1917)
227 Mass. 562, 116 N.E. 941.
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move trustees,28 to terminate the trust,2 9 to hold annual meetings
and take such action as they deem best,2 0 or in fact giving the
beneficiaries any control whatsoever over the trustees or the es-
tate so that the beneficiaries are the masters and the principals
rather than the trustees being in absolute control,3 1 have been
held to preclude the creation of a pure trust. Other features
have been held bad such as providing for an absolute suspension
of the power of alienation for a longer period than is permis-
sible.3 2 These are matters to be determined by the general laws
of trusts of the state by which the organization is to be tested,
as is true of all the provisions of the instrument. It is not the
purpose of this article to consider such questions, reference being
made to some cases, however, to show how the courts have
approached such organizations and as indicating that the pres-
ence of any provision in a declaration which does violence to
the trust laws applicable defeats the creation of a pure trust.
Business trusts must stand the test of the strict laws of trusts.
Applications from such organizations for license to sell securi-
ties open the entire field of trust law for consideration. If for
any reason the attempted organization fails as a pure trust, the
applicant is not what it purports to be or what it represents and
will represent itself to be, but is some sort of loose unincorpor-
ated association, joint enterprise or profit sharing scheme, whose
validity and right to exist and whose privileges and obligations,
as well as those of all interested parties, are determined by an
entirely different branch of the law. Holding itself out to be
one kind of an organization when in fact it is an entirely different
organization, is a misrepresentation of a substantial fact, is mis-
leading and deceptive to the purchaser of securities and will re-
sult in fraud being committed. The purchaser may, because of
the representation as to this fact, believe that he is securing lim-
27Simpson v. Klipstein, (1920) 262 Fed. 823; Dana v. Treasurer, (1917)
227 Mass. 562, 116 N.E. 941.2sHussey v. Arnold, (1904) 185 Mass. 202, 70 N.E. 87; Frost v. Thomp-
son, (1914) 219 Mass. 360, 106 N.E. 1009.
29Williams v. Johnson, (1911) 208 Mass. 544, 95 N.E. 90; Frost v.
Thompson, (1914) 219 Mass. 360, 106 N.E. 1009: Hussey v. Arnold, (1904)
185 Mass. 202, 70 N.E. 87.
sOPriestly v. Treasurer, (1918) 230 Mass. 452, 120 N.E. 100; but see
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, (1916) 39 R. I. 193, 98
Atl. 273.
3'See citations under note 1. Also, Partnership Liability under the
Business Trust, by N. B. Judah, 17 Ill. Law Rev. 77; Limited Liability in
Business Trusts, by Robert S. Stevens, 7 Cornell Quart. 116; Sears, op.
cit. pp. 144 and 369; A Survey of Business Trusts by Frederick A. Thulin,
16 Ill.L.Rev. 370.32Winsor v. Mills, (1892) 157 Mass. 362, 32 N.E. 352.
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ited liability and the other advantages supposed to attach to a
certificate of beneficial interest in a pure trust. And while rep-
resentation as to the legal effect of the organization may be a
representation of law only and not the basis for the commission
of fraud,3 3 the usual case will involve a representation as to sub-
stantial facts. 34  Again, failing as a pure trust, its securities,
whether called certificates of beneficial interest in X, an associa-
tion formed by declaration of trust under the common law, cer-
tificates of beneficial interest in a trust estate, stock, participat-
ing certificates, or units, are not in fact certificates evidencing
ownership of the interest held by the beneficiary of a pure trust,
but are in fact certificates evidencing some sort of membership or
participation in some sort of unincorporated association, joint
adventure or profit sharing scheme, to which are attached sub-
stantially different privileges and obligations. Representing a
security to be one thing and selling it as such when it is an
entirely different security is a misrepresentation of a substantial
fact on which the purchaser relies and constitutes fraud. Appli-
cations from so-called business trusts which fail as such for any
reason must be denied under any law designed to prevent fraud
in the sale of securities. And, it is submitted, a blue sky body
has the power and should refuse to entertain an application from
an alleged trust estate which is illegal and is not what it purports
to be.35
Do BUSINESS TRUSTS VIOLATE TIE CORPORATION LAWS?
One of the first attacks made on business trusts -was that they
exercised corporate powers and enjoyed corporate privileges
without complying with the corporation statutes and in violation
thereof, that they looked and acted like corporations, that they
were therefore illegal and not entitled to recognition, and that
they were subject to dissolution proceedings. It is doubtless
true that a great many organizations purporting to be trusts have
been created by a desire to escape the many burdens attaching
to corporations and to find a vehicle having most of the advan-
tages of a corporation. This desire has, in many instances, re-
sulted in a declaration so trimmed up and enlarged that, although
talking in the language of a trust, it has contained most of the
a3Schmidt v. Stortz, (Mo. 1922) 236 S.W. 694.
34If representation is as to the legal effect of the organization by virtue
of the law of some other state, there is then a representation of a fact.
35Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, (1920) 107 Kans. 153, 190 Pac. 601;
State ex rel. Range v. Hinkle, (Wash. 1923) 219 Pac. 41; Apartment Bldg.
Co. v. Daugherty, (Cal. 1923) 213 Pac. 983.
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features usually associated with corporations, such as a fixed
capital, negotiable certificates of stock, officers, boards of direc-
tors, executive committees, and annual meetings, supplemented
by a claim to limited liability, perpetual succession, etc., and the
organization created thereby appeared to look and act like a cor-
poration. That these organizations are in violation of the cor-
poration statutes has been held by the attorney general of Ohio,36
and of Minnesota. 7 If this is a correct position and they are
for this reason invalid and illegal and cannot be created, it is
obvious that any body administering a blue sky law could refuse
to accept their applications, 8 and, if accepted, would have a duty
to deny.
An analysis of the usual business trust shows that the instru-
ment of creation is in the form and language of a declaration
or deed of trust, that the only intention disclosed is to create a
trust, there being no evidence of an intention to create a corpoia-
tion, that no attempt is made to comply with the corporation stat-
utes, that there is no overt act in compliance with such statutes,
that there is no holding out as a corporation, and that no inten-
tion or attempt is displayed to exercise certain powers or privileges
as a corporation. It may be true that, if the organization is a
pure trust, perpetual succession will be enjoyed in that the trust
survives the death of a trustee or a beneficiary, and also that the
beneficiaries will have limited liability, in fact no liability. These,
however, are advantages attaching to the trust because of the
trust laws and not because of any attempt to create a corporation
or to acquire corporate powers in violation of the corporation
statutes. The general corporation laws are permissive only. They
do not provide that certain privileges can be enjoyed only by cor-
porations. Granted that a corporation has perpetual succession,
limited liability, etc., by virtue of the general corporation stat-
utes, it does not follow that any other organization securing these
privileges by contract, declaration of trust, or any other means,
is doing so in violation of the corporation laws and entitled to
be dealt with accordingly. Nor are capital, certificates of stock,
officers, annual meetings, etc., things to be enjoyed only by
corporations and prohibited to all others. Applications from
business trusts cannot properly be denied on this ground.
86Sears, op. cit. 343.
37Opinion by Montreville J. Brown, Assistant Attorney General, dated
April 30, 1919. See also opinion on same subject dated June 20, 1921.
3sSee cases cited in note 35.
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ARE BUSINESS TRUSTS CORPORATIONS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
Many state constitutions, 9 contain provisions of which the
following is typical:
"The term 'corporation' as used in this article, shall be con-
strued to include all associations and joint stock companies hav-
ing any of the powers and privileges (or corporations) 40 not
possessed by individuals or partnerships, ..4. 11
Based on this provision some courts have held that business
trusts purporting to have limited liability, perpetual succession,
right to sue and be sued in the adopted name, etc., were corpora-
tions.
In Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins,12 the Kansas court first
decided that the Home Lumber Company, which was formed by
declaration of trust, was a pure trust, and that it was exercising
and enjoying powers and privileges not possessed by individuals
and partnerships, that it was a corporation within the constitu-
tional provision, and that it therefore could not be mandamus-
force the state charter board to consider its application for
license under the blue sky law until it had complied with the
corporation laws. On motion for modification it appeared that
the company desired to sell its own securities only and not to
engage generally in the business of selling securities, whereupon
the court issued the writ, being of the opinion that the sale of
its securities alone did not constitute an engaging in business
within the meaning of the foreign corporation act and did not
require compliance with such laws.43
The Kansas court has since applied this decision,44 holding
that service by publication, as provided by the corporation laws,
was good against the United States Mexico Oil Company, a
"Massachusetts trust," on the ground that it was within the
39Spottswood v. Morris, (1906) 12 Idaho 360, 85 Pac. 1094.
40Words in parenthesis appear in some constitutions, including Idaho.4 1Minnesota constitution, article 10, section 1.
42(1920) 107 Kans. 153, 161, 190 Pac. 601. See Kansas constitution,
article 12, section 6.43For other cases holding that selling securities issued by the seller is
not an engaging in business within meaning of the foreign corporation
laws, see First National Bank v. Leeper, (1906) 121 Mo. App. 688, 97 S.W.
636; Bartlett v. Insurance Company, (1877) 18 Kans. 369; Payson v. With-
ers, (1873) 19 Fed. Cas. No. 10,864 5 Biss. (U.S.C.C.) 269, 2 Ins. Law
J. 599, 5 Chi. Leg. News 445; Union Trust Company v. Sickels, (1908)
109 N.Y.S. 262; but see contra, Langston v. Phillips, (1921) 89 So. 523,
206 Ala. 174.44Harris v. United States Mexico Oil Co., (1922) 110 Kans. 532, 204
Pac. 754.
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constitutional definition of a corporation and subject to the cor-
poration statutes. A like result was reached in Washington, 45
where the court sustained the secretary of state in refusing to
consider the application of the Securities Sales Syndicate, which
purported to be a "common law business trust," on the ground
that it was a corporation by virtue of the constitutional pro-
vision,46 and was "prohibited from doing business within this
state," and had "no legal status in this state.147
Another line of decisions hold that business trusts are not,
because of the definition in question, to be regarded as corpora-
tions for all purposes. 48
In State v. Cosgrove,49 the court says in construing the con-
stitutional definition in question, which is section 16, article 11
of the Idaho constitution:
"It is clear from the very terms of Section 16 that the word
'corporation' was intended to be there defined only as used in
Article 11. The section clearly recognizes the existence of cor-
porations in the usual and ordinary sense, as well as of associa-
tions and joint stock companies, but for the particular purposes
of Article 11, it modifies and enlarges the scope of the term. It
is not authority, however, for the altogether antithetical proposi-
tion that the term 'corporation' when not used 'in this article*
but in a quasi penal statute enacted long before the adoption of
the constitution, also includes all associations having or exercising
any of the powers or privileges of corporations. . . .A corpora-
tion cannot be formed by private agreement between individuals
nor can the state force its bounty upon private persons by in-
corporating them without their consent and against their will."
In State ex rel. Great American Home Savings Institution v.
Lee50 the Supreme court of Missouri says on this point:
"It is obvious that the article of the constitution and statute
referred to do not by legislative fiat convert joint stock compan-
ies or voluntary associations into corporations or require their
incorporation before doing business."
The Kansas theory finds that the usual business trust is an
"association," that it enjoys "powers and privileges not pos-
sessed by individuals and partnerships," that it is a corporation
and has no standing whatsoever until it complies with the cor-
poration laws, that the constitutional provision is a determination
45State ex rel. Range v. Hinkle, (Wash. 1923) 219 Pac. 41.46Articld 12, section 5.
47See also inference in Wagner v. Kelso, (1923) 195 Ia. 959, 193
N.W. 1, that same result might be reached in iowa.48The leading case is Spottswood v. Morris, (1906) 12 Idaho 360,
85 Pac. 1094.49(1922) 36 Idaho 278, 210 Pac. 393.
50(1921) 288 Mo. 679, 233 S.W. 20.
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of what organizations are to be deemed corporations whenever
the word is used, and either abolishes all associations or joint
stock companies having any of the powers in question or auto-
matically converts them into corporations. It in effect says that
the corporation statutes are exclusive and restrictive and that
any organization enjoying certain privileges must incorporate.
The words "in this article" appearing in the constitutional defi-
nition are entirely disregarded.
The Idaho theory, it is submitted, is the more logical and
gives full force and effect to the words "in this article" by stating
that the provision in question is not a definition of corporations
for all times but only a convenient classification of all such
organizations for the purpose of the article of the constitution in
which it appears.
The Kansas cases are not satisfactory. In one place it is
stated that "to meet requirements of our law the company must
bring itself within the rules applicable to corporations and con-
form to the regulations imposed by statute on corporations."
In another place that "many statutory provisions have been en-
acted for the organization and regulation of corporations which
are wholly inconsistent with the organization and plan of the
plaintiff company, and with which it will manifestly be unable to
conform." In other words it must conform to laws with which
it cannot conform. Again in speaking of the constitutional pro-
vision, "the definition so adopted is not necessarily to be applied
to the word 'corporation' wherever it is used in the statute," a
leaning to the Idaho theory, and yet when used in the general
corporation statutes they give to it the broadest meaning of the
constitutional provision.5 '
The two theories above discussed are in conflict and raise
an uncertainty as regards business trusts. In some states they
are corporations and in some they are not. In others the matter
is in doubt. As to these latter states the trustees of a business
trust who desire to enter a particular state to carry on business
or to sell stock may find that their organization is a corpora-
tion and has no standing whatsoever. On applications for license
51The Kansas cases attempt to distinguish result reached from that in
Idaho on ground that Idaho definition includes the words "of corporations"
and is therefore limited to those organizations enjoying these rights by stat-
utory enactment, but that the Kansas constitution by leaving these words
out showed an intention to include all organizations regardless of how rights
were secured. The reasoning of the Idaho cases however does not turn on
the inclusion of these words, and the Washington case cited in note 45
reaches the Kansas result on a constitutional provision which includes the
words in question.
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to sell securities the blue sky board should consider the applicant
to be what it is by the laws of their state regardless of what it
may be by the laws of the state of creation.52 If by this test it
is a corporation by virtue of the constitution and as such has not
complied with the corporation laws, it has no legal standing and
its application should not be entertained. Otherwise an organiza-
tion which violates the laws of a particular state would neverthe-
less be given recognition and standing by the blue sky board and
permitted to sell its securities in that state. In this respect the
final result in the case of Home Lumber Comnpany v. Hopkins,
5 3
seems not correct, a result which permits an organization which
is deemed a corporation but which has not complied with any
corporation laws, either of Kansas or any other state, to have
full standing before its charter board, and to force that body
to recognize its application for license to sell securities. The dis-
tinction between engaging in the general business of selling se-
curities and selling its own securities is not sound and does not
justify recognizing an organization which is found to exist in
violation of law. Once the position is taken that a business trust
is a corporation which has not complied with the corporation
laws, but exists, if at all, in violation thereof, the matter should
be carried to its logical conclusion and the organization given no
standing in court, as was done in State ex rel. Range v. Hinkle.54
On the contrary, if the applying company purports to be a
business trust formed, for example, under the laws of Washing-
ton, and which by the case cited would be deemed to be a corpora-
tion and in violation of the corporation laws of that state, and
application is made in a state where by decisions it would not
be a corporation, such as Idaho, it is submitted that the same
result should follow, namely, refusal to entertain the applica-
tion and give the organization any standing. Otherwise the
state considering the application would be recognizing the or-
ganization in a manner in which the state of creation would
not recognize it and would treat it as something which it was
not by the laws of such state of creation.
There have been no decisions in Minnesota directly on this
point. If by virtue of the Minnesota constitution these organi-
zations are held to be corporations for all purposes, then the
result reached in the attorney general's opinion is correct, but
52See Harris v. United States Mexico Oil Company, (1922) 110 Kans.
532, 204 Pac. 754.
53(1920) 107 Kans. 153, 190 Pac. 601.54 (Wash. 1923) 219 Pac. 41.
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for a different reason.55 In such event business trusts regardless
of where formed would have no standing in Minnesota and could
not rightly be licensed to sell their own securities or to deal gen-
erally in securities. In this connection it is again suggested that
business trusts which are what they purport to be are in no sense
"associations" or "companies" and do not come within the classes
covered by the constitutional. definitions, even for the purposes
of the definitions as limited by the Idaho cases."
STATUTORY ENACTMENTS AFFECTING BUSINESs TRUSTS
Consideration must be given to statutes, if any, regulating
the formation of trusts. Broad statements are frequently made
to the effect "that a trust may be created for all purposes for
which the individual may use property or property rights.5 7 Many
states, however, have passed statutes purporting to define and
limit the purposes for which trusts may be declared.5 8 When a
particular declaration of trust comes up for consideration its
purposes and the powers of the trustees thereunder must be con-
sidered in the light of any such statutes in effect in the state
by the laws of which the validity of the trust is to be determined.
If the trust violates any such statute, the attempted formation
fails and the trust does not come into being as such, its certificates
represent something substantially different from what they pur-
port to represent,5 9 and its application cannot be entertained
or granted without giving recognition to an invalid organization.
In Minnesota where the statutes have abolished all uses and
trusts except those formed for certain specified purposes, 60 it is
submitted that the attempted formation of a business trust to
explore for oil, to operate a mine, to exploit a patent, to conduct
a chain of grocery stores, and, in fact, for the purpose of carry-
ing on any business as distinct from a trust for investment pur-
poses only, fails and the organization has no standing.8
55This opinion, it is interesting to note, is based upon the identical
organization which by Harris v. United States Mexico Oil Company, (1922)
110 Kans. 532, 204 Pac. 754, was held to be a corporation and in violation
of the corporation laws of Kansas.56See Thompson, Business Trusts as Substitutes for Business Corpo-
rations.
57Dunn, Trusts for Business Purposes 4.
5sSee Bogart, Trusts 160.591n Bryant v. Shaw, (1920) 190 App. Div. 578, 184 N.Y.S. 315, 911,
it is held that the purported trust under consideration was not within the
purposes for which an express trust could be formed in New York and
that interested parties were not beneficiaries holding an equitable title but
held legal title as tenants in common.
6OMinn., G.S. 1913, chap. 60.
611n. re application of The Investment Trust of St. Paul, the declara-
tion of trust, which was executed in Minnesota and where the principal
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PRACTICAL QUESTIONS RAISED By BUSINESS TRUSTS
Business trusts which are free from all legal objections and
are in fact what they purport to be, pure trusteeships, present a
practical question in the administration of securities law, for
which purpose they are necessarily considered largely from the
point of vie-w of the purchasers of securities. Such adminis-
trative bodies usually look with disfavor, and rightly so, upon
corporations so organized as to place exclusive control in the
hands of the organizers or in a class of stock for which little or
nothing of value was paid, especially where the organization is
new and those who attempt to retain control have not demon-
strated that they are entitled to it. Such features have come
to be considered earmarks of a promotion in which the organ-
izers hope to profit from the promotion rather than from the
success of the enterprise, as opening the door for manipulation,
as not letting the purchaser of stock in on a reasonably fair basis,
and as not furnishing the means whereby he can follow his
investment to his, protection. The controlling effect over offi-
cers of the voting right, even though not exercised, is an ele-
ment usually deemed essential to the usual speculative security.
What then of a pure trust in which stockholders can have no
voting control whatsoever and can protect themselves only by
resort to the slow and expensive processes of a court of equity?
Are the administrative bodies on consideration of such applica-
tions to waive their general theory applied to corporations and
discriminate against them? Are they to permit an organization
in which the trustees are usually self appointed and may
have invested nothing in the enterprise but who are nevertheless
the sole managers, finance itself by general sales of securities
to the public the purchasers of which securities must thereafter
place of business was located, recited that the trust was formed for the
purpose of establishing a trust fund by the sale of beneficial interests and
to invest and reinvest same for the proportionate benefit of the ben-
eficiaries. Application was made to the Minnesota commission for a
dealer's license under the Minnesota statute, which statute defined a dealer
as "Every person, firm, co-partnership, company, corporation, or associa-
tion . . . which shall . . . sell or offer for sale any of the securities issued by
an investment company . . . or who shall . . . profess to engage in the busi-
ness of selling or offering for sale such securities. . ." Application was de-
nied on the ground that the recited powers of the declaration did not cover
the transaction of business as a dealer as defined by the statute and also that
even though amended to include such powers same were beyond the powers
and purposes for which an express trust could be formed as defined by the
Minnesota statutes.
See also opinion of attorney general dated June 20, 1921, and cited in
note 37.
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sit back and see their business managed by those who may suffer
no loss upon failure and whose position can be taken from them
only by appeal to the equity court and then only by showing
mismanagement to the detriment of the trust? Mere lack of good
business judgment or failure to make profits, or any other rea-
son which might result in changing corporate officers, will not
entitle the stockholder to relief.
Again what of the many advantages and protections attach-
ing to corporate stock such as inspection of books, cumulative
voting, right to purchase pro rata share of increases of stock,
right of corporation to increase its capital stock by vote of stock-
holders6 2 right to force declaration of dividends under certain
conditions, restrictions against declaration of dividends which
impair capital, 3 right to force complete sale of assets and dis-
continuance of business,"4 and many other rights which will
occur to anyone familiar with corporation laws? These are ele-
ments which a body administering a blue sky law recognizes as
attaching to the corporate security being considered. Are they
all to be waived and regarded as unessential when considering a
pure business trust? It may be contended, and probably cor-
rectly, that many of such advantages can be had by proper pro-
visions in the declaration of trust. It is a fact, however, that
most declarations are entirely silent on many such matters, and
to provide for them would require close analysis of the corpora-
tion laws and result in the trust instrument being a resum6
thereof. Consistent application of the attitude taken on corpora-
tions will considerably narrow the field of business trusts. Many
other doubts will arise in a particular state. For example, in
I Minnesota, are the certificates transferable?65 Are the bene-
ficiaries sufficiently definite?"6
All organizations referred to as business trusts face a dilemma.
On the one hand is the possibility of failing as pure trusts be-
62The amount of beneficial interests of a trust is determined by the
creator of the trust and unless the declaration expressly authorizes the
trustees to increase, it is probable that they do not have such power even
though the business will suffer for lack of additional capital. And giving
such right to the trustees may defeat the organization as a trust.
63In Gardner v. Gardner, (1912) 212 Mass. 508, 99 N.E. 95, it was
held that a trustee could issue additional shares of stock to holders of pre-
ferred stock to pay up arrears on their preferred dividends even though
there be no funds which could be considered as profits, undivided earnings
or accumulated surplus sufficient to meet the disbursements.
64Some courts have held that power in the beneficiaries to terminate a
trust is fatal. See cases in note 29.
6 5Minn., G.S. 1913, sec. 6718.66Dunnell's Minnesota Digest, sec. 9885.
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cause of the addition of some desired advantage. On the other
are the restrictions of the trust laws, if a pure trust. In the
hands of the promoter and organizer of new enterprises the
business trust is of no value unless it can be dressed up to look
like a corporation and to have many of the advantages which
appeal to the prospective purchaser of securities. Stripped of
these and so organized as to be in fact a pure trust the organiza-
tion loses its charm and cannot be sold on its merits. That these
organizations are not misrepresented to the investing public and
do not mask under false colors is a duty which falls squarely
on blue sky administrators.
Aside from the problems which blue sky laws should prop-
erly raise there are the further possibilities of being regarded as
pure trusts in one state and of failing as such in another, of being
a corporation in one and precluded from doing business, and
of not being a corporation in another, of being regarded as a
trust company and subject to trust company statutes in one state
and not in another. All of these are substantial difficulties and
are matters on which the courts are still in conflict and which
will preclude business trusts from being resorted to by legiti-
mate business to any considerable extent. The writer disagrees
with the prediction in an article by R. J. Powell,6 7 to the effect
that the business trust is succeeding the corporation, and believes
that as blue sky bodies and the courts are called upon to consider
such organizations the present wave will subside and the use
of the declaration of trust for business purposes will return to
more narrow limits. This does not say that pure trusts cannot
be validly formed and that there are not many instances in which
their use is proper. Considerable litigation is in prospect, how-
ever, before the modem business trust is securely established and
its scope of usefulness defined.
67The Passing of the Corporation in Business, by R. J. Powell, 2 MIN-
NESOTA LAW REvIEW 401.
